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Introduction
Household consumption accounts for around two thirds of
aggregate spending in the UK economy.  So decisions by
households on whether to spend or save are a key influence on
the economic outlook.  The share of their income that
households saved fell steadily over much of the period 1995 to
2007 (Chart 1). 
More recently, the economic environment has changed
substantially with credit conditions tightening sharply and a
global slump in confidence leading to a recession across much
of the world.  In the United Kingdom, output has fallen by
around 51/@% over the past year.  These developments are
likely to have altered households’ views of the appropriate
balance between saving and spending.  By the end of 2008 and
early 2009, the saving ratio had picked up a little relative to
2007 and early 2008.  The August 2009 Inflation Report also
highlighted the outlook for household saving as a key
uncertainty (page 43).  The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
considered it likely that the saving ratio would rise further. 
This article considers some of the factors that are likely to have
driven the changes in saving outlined above.  The next two
sections set out the theoretical underpinnings for household
spending and saving decisions.  Subsequent sections then
consider possible explanations for the decline in the saving
ratio between 1995 and 2007 and the potential impact on
saving of the recent global financial turbulence, before
concluding.(2)
What is household saving?
Households’ saving represents the balance between their
current income and their current consumption.  By not
spending some of their current income on consumption, or
alternatively by borrowing, households can accumulate
financial assets, such as deposits and shares, and housing
assets.  This identity for funds raised and assets accumulated
can be written as:
where S is saving;  D is the net acquisition of debt;  A is the net
acquisition of financial assets;  and H is the net acquisition of
housing assets.(3)
S + D = A + H
Funds raised Assets accumulated
Household decisions on whether to save or spend play a key role in the outlook for aggregate
demand.  A range of factors could help to explain the fall in the household saving ratio over the
period 1995 to 2007.  Declines in long-term real interest rates, looser credit conditions, rising asset
values and greater macroeconomic stability are all likely to have reduced the incentive or the need
to save.  Lower household saving was also offset to some extent by higher corporate saving.  Since
2007, the financial crisis and subsequent recession have unwound some of these factors and may
continue to lead to a rise in household saving.  
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In practice, some households will be borrowing to increase the
funds they have available for consumption while others will be
saving.  In aggregate, though, households tend to save, and do
so mainly to finance investment in housing.  Accumulating
more financial assets raises households’ stock of net financial
wealth, while accumulating debt reduces it, other things being
equal.  Of course, wealth may also change independently of
households’ saving decisions, as changes in financial asset
prices will alter the value of the stock of assets.
Consumption and saving theory
There are many reasons why different households’ incomes
and spending decisions may vary.  This section abstracts from
these different saving motives at the individual household
level and focuses on the macroeconomic determinants that
help to explain why aggregate household saving can vary over
time. 
Permanent income
Following the work of Friedman in the 1950s, modern
consumption theory has been built on the 
life-cycle/permanent-income model.  In that model,
households base their current spending decisions on their 
so-called permanent incomes, the income they would expect
to receive on average over their entire lifetimes.  This approach
recognises that households are to some degree forward
looking and that they would prefer a smoother consumption
path to a more variable one.
The permanent-income model has clear implications for saving
behaviour.  If income is higher now than it is expected to be in
the future, then households will save today.  If income is lower
now than it is expected to be in the future, then households
will dissave (by borrowing or selling existing assets).  For
example, in an economic downturn in which current incomes
temporarily fall below future incomes, households will run
down their savings to support current consumption.  Although
simple, this logic is powerful and may be able to explain some
of the historical swings in saving and spending.  For example,
Attanasio and Weber (1994) provide evidence that part of the
consumption boom and decline in the saving ratio in the late
1980s was due to rising optimism on the part of households
about their future income prospects.
Interest rates
The risk-free real interest rate is a key determinant of the
amount of real spending that a household can achieve in the
future by forgoing consumption today and saving.  Here, 
risk-free means there is no possibility of a borrower defaulting
on loan repayments.  A higher real interest rate encourages
consumers to postpone consumption because it increases the
real return to saving (and the real cost of borrowing).  It also
redistributes income from borrowers to savers.  If savers are
less likely to spend that income than borrowers, this could also
push down on aggregate spending and increase the saving
ratio.  
Anticipated changes in the real interest rate should already be
factored in to households’ spending plans and so would not be
associated with a large change in saving.  But an unanticipated
increase in the real interest rate, for example, would tend to
lead to a fall in current spending and an increase in the saving
ratio.  The strength of that effect will depend on households’
preferences over the timing of their spending.  Households
may choose not to postpone much spending in response to an
unanticipated rise in real rates if they prefer a very smooth
consumption profile over time.
Credit conditions
Some households may not be able to borrow as much as they
want to finance their desired consumption.  In practice, banks
charge a higher rate on borrowing, and pay a lower rate on
deposits, than the risk-free rate assumed in the standard
permanent-income model.  And some households that are
deemed to be less creditworthy may face a much higher cost
of borrowing or may be denied access to credit altogether.  If
credit becomes more expensive or more difficult to obtain,
then borrowing and spending will be lower and so aggregate
saving will be higher.  That means that changes in the price or
quantity of credit may be important drivers of the aggregate
saving ratio in a similar way to changes in the risk-free real
interest rate.
Uncertainty
Uncertainty about future income may also play an important
role in shaping households’ consumption and saving decisions
(see for example Leland (1968) and Carroll (2001)).  In the
absence of perfect insurance markets, risk-averse consumers
will wish to maintain a buffer of savings as a precaution
against unexpected falls in income.  That will help them to
avoid undesirable swings in spending and smooth their
consumption.  A rise in uncertainty, for example if households
believe there is a larger risk of losing their job, is likely to lead
to an increase in the amount of precautionary saving that
households choose to undertake.  
Wealth
A household’s financial wealth forms part of its lifetime
resources so an increase in its value, for example as equity
prices rise, would tend to encourage households to spend
more and save less.  Of course, the extent to which a change in
asset prices is associated with a change in consumer spending
also depends on why asset prices changed (Millard and Power
(2004)).  For example, if equity prices rose because of a fall in
the volatility of equity returns — implying a fall in the
compensation for holding riskier assets such as shares instead
of government bonds — then consumption and the saving
ratio may not change.  The dividends paid and household
permanent incomes would be unchanged.
There are a number of reasons why households may not
respond, or may respond only slowly, to movements in wealth.Research and analysis Household saving 193
Asset prices can be volatile and households may not expect
recent changes to persist.  Moreover, around half of
households’ financial assets are tied up in life assurance and
pension funds.  Changes in the value of those assets may be
less visible to households.  Corporate ownership is also likely to
be unevenly distributed.  For example, the British Household
Panel Survey suggests that only around 25% of households
own equities directly.  Such households are likely to be
wealthier and so may be less likely to increase their spending
in response to a rise in the value of their assets than if
corporate ownership were more evenly distributed across the
population.  
Some studies suggest that the long-run marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth in the United Kingdom is around 
0.04–0.06.  That suggests that if wealth increases by £1,
consumption increases by around 4 to 6 pence per year 
(see Bertaut (2002), Boone et al (2001) and Ludwig and Sløk
(2002)).  But such estimates are subject to considerable
uncertainty. 
Housing assets are rather different from financial assets
because households also obtain a stream of housing services
from them.  As Benito et al (2006) highlight, declines in house
prices make some people better off (those expecting to trade
up or potential first-time buyers) and some people worse off
(those expecting to trade down).  So it is not clear that
changes in the value of housing assets should have any impact
on aggregate consumption through an ordinary wealth effect.  
Changes in house prices could still affect aggregate
consumption and saving through a number of other channels.
In particular, a rise in house values means that households
have more collateral against which to borrow.  That can make
it easier for households to obtain credit.  If that leads them to
spend more, it would temporarily reduce the household saving
ratio.  Housing equity can also form part of a household’s
precautionary saving balances.  For example, in the event of
job loss, a household may be able to withdraw equity from
their home to tide them over until they find another job.  An
increase in house prices can therefore reduce the need to hold
alternative forms of precautionary saving like financial assets,
allowing households to spend more and save less.
Government and corporate saving
Households are also likely to be influenced by how much other
sectors of the economy are saving.  Saving by companies and
the government should ultimately flow back to households via
lower taxes or higher dividends.  Therefore, in principle, it
should be the overall level of saving in the economy — or
national saving — that households care about.
The theory of Ricardian equivalence, dating back to the work of
Ricardo (1820), suggests that households view their own
saving and government saving as perfect substitutes.  So if the
government borrows to fund a tax cut, households should
anticipate that this will require higher taxes in the future (for
unchanged government spending).  They will save the tax cut
to pay for the future increase in taxes and maintain a smooth
profile for consumption.  Lower government saving (or higher
government borrowing) is therefore offset by higher household
saving.  A similar argument applies to corporate saving as well.
In practice, while government and corporate saving are likely
to be important influences on household saving, they are likely
to be imperfect substitutes.  So the level of household saving is
important as well as national saving.
One important assumption for Ricardian equivalence is that
perfect capital markets exist.  As noted earlier, some
households are likely to be constrained in the amount of credit
they can obtain, so they may be currently consuming less than
they would ideally like.  For those households, a tax cut allows
them to increase their current consumption towards the
desired level.  So if some households are credit constrained,
they will spend the extra income from a tax cut rather than
save it, and lower government saving would be only partly
offset by higher household saving. 
Ricardian equivalence also assumes that households care
about their children’s well-being and that they leave bequests
(Barro (1974)).  Tax rises that are expected to occur beyond the
lifetime of the current generation will only lead to an increase
in household saving now if households care about their
children who will have to pay the extra taxes.
Intergenerational altruism is likely to be imperfect in practice,
although there is no consensus about the extent of that
imperfection (see for example Modigliani (1988) and Kotlikoff
(1988) for two alternative views).  Other assumptions required
for full Ricardian equivalence to hold, such as that taxes do not
distort the allocation of resources, may also be unrealistic.
The relationship between household saving and corporate
saving is likely to be affected by the ownership of companies.
As noted earlier, much of the corporate sector is owned
indirectly by households through pension funds, and
ownership is unevenly distributed.  That could make the
response of household saving to changes in corporate saving
more muted.  Furthermore, a substantial part of the UK
corporate sector is owned by overseas investors — almost half
of UK quoted shares.  So not all UK corporate saving will flow
back to UK households.  Conversely, some UK households own
shares in overseas companies, either directly or indirectly, so
corporate saving in other countries may also affect household
saving in this country.
Inflation
Some household assets are fixed in nominal terms, such as
deposits.  Inflation erodes the real value of these assets.  To
compensate for this loss, a higher inflation rate is usually194 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
associated with a higher nominal interest rate and higher
interest receipts.  But households must save rather than spend
those higher interest receipts for the real value of their wealth
to be maintained.  Higher inflation should therefore lead to
higher saving.  If the higher inflation was not anticipated, it
may not be reflected in longer-term interest rates and so
interest receipts may not fully compensate households for the
fall in the real value of their assets.  They would then need to
reduce their consumption to finance the additional saving.
Large swings in inflation could therefore generate significant
changes in the saving ratio.  
Demographics
The life-cycle/permanent-income model implies that
households’ saving behaviour is likely to differ systematically
over their lifetimes.  The model predicts that households
should borrow when they are young and their incomes are
relatively low, save for retirement during middle age when
their incomes are higher, and then run down that saving during
retirement.  Although the simple life-cycle model cannot
explain all aspects of the data, empirical evidence supports
that broad life-cycle pattern of saving (eg Banks and Blundell
(1994)).
Changes in the age structure of the population over time can
therefore affect the aggregate saving ratio.  For example, the
passing of the large baby-boom generation through middle
age into retirement would be expected to be associated with a
decline in the saving ratio as the ‘baby-boomers’ move from a
stage of their life in which they are saving to a stage of their
life in which they are dissaving.  Other demographic trends
may affect aggregate household saving too.  For example,
rising life expectancy would encourage higher saving to the
extent that households have to fund longer retirements than
they had previously expected.  Over long periods of time,
these demographic changes can be powerful drivers of saving.
But they are likely to be very slow moving, reflecting gradual
changes in the demographics themselves.
Why did household saving fall between the
mid-1990s and 2007?
The household saving ratio fell from around 10% in the 
mid-1990s to around 2% by mid-2007, before the financial
crisis began.  That does not necessarily imply a boom in
household consumption.  As Nickell (2004) pointed out, while
consumption growth was strong in the late 1990s, this has not
been true since 2000.  The average quarterly growth rate of
real household consumption between 2000 and 2007 was
around 0.7%, in line with the average rate since 1975.  And
over the same period, nominal household consumption fell
slightly as a share of GDP.  The fact that the consumption
share fell despite the falling saving ratio can be explained by
the fact that household disposable incomes also fell as a share
of GDP over that period.  Even if consumption was not
unusually strong, households did choose to save less.  Using
the key determinants set out above, this section briefly
considers some potential explanations for that decline in
saving.  
Was saving low in 2007?
By mid-2007 the household saving ratio was low by historical
standards.  But that does not take into account the impact of
inflation.  Since inflation targeting began in the early 1990s,
inflation has been lower and more stable than it was during
the 1970s and 1980s.  Chart 2 presents a measure of the
household saving ratio that has been adjusted for inflation.
This strips out the saving required to maintain the real value of
nominal assets as it is eroded by inflation.  It shows that the
saving ratio was low during the 1970s once the high levels of
inflation were taken into account, and the saving ratio in the
early 1990s looks relatively high.  The subsequent decline in
the late 1990s and through much of the current decade could
simply be saving returning to more normal levels.  But it could
also be that households did not respond fully to the high
inflation in the 1970s and so using an average of saving ratios
for comparison which includes that period may be misleading. 
As noted earlier, households’ saving decisions are also likely to
be influenced by corporate and government saving.  National
saving was much more stable than household saving from the
mid-1990s to 2007, mainly due to rising corporate saving
(Chart 3).  To the extent that corporate saving is a substitute
for household saving, that may have been a factor in
households’ decisions to reduce their saving ratio.  But as
Whitaker (2007) points out, national saving was still low
relative to the level required to finance enough investment to
maintain the capital stock.
Factors pulling down on household saving
From the mid-1990s to 2007, changes in a number of the key
determinants of household saving are likely to have
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Chart 2 Inflation-adjusted household saving ratio(a)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) Saving adjusted for the impact of inflation on the real value of assets and debt held by the
household sector which are fixed in nominal terms.  Percentage of inflation-adjusted post-tax
income.  See Davey (2001).Research and analysis Household saving 195
UK long-term real interest rates (as measured by index-linked
gilts) fell by over 2 percentage points.  Analysis using a
disaggregated model of household behaviour in Benito et al
(2007) suggests that this might explain a fall in the saving ratio
of around 4 percentage points, or half of the decline in the
household saving ratio over that period.  
The late 1990s and early 2000s were also characterised by
stable non-inflationary growth.  The unemployment rate fell
sharply in the late 1990s and remained stable at around 5%
for much of this decade.  Greater macroeconomic stability is
likely to have reduced precautionary saving by households as
the risks of an unexpected fall in income were lower.
In the earlier part of this decade, the supply of credit appeared
to increase substantially.  Spreads between Bank Rate and
mortgage rates narrowed from over 100 basis points at the
start of the decade, to around 50 basis points at the end of
2006 (Chart 4).  The average loan to income ratio on new
mortgage lending also rose over this period.  Cheaper and
easier access to credit is likely to have made some households
bring forward consumption and therefore reduce aggregate
saving.  
Rising asset prices may also have encouraged households to
save less.  Capital gains on their existing stock of assets acted
to offset the decline in saving, so that households’ net financial
wealth was still at around the same level, relative to income,
at the end of 2006 as it was a decade earlier.  On average,
households had been drawing down on their net financial
wealth over that period as debt accumulation (mainly
associated with homeownership) outstripped new purchases
of financial assets.  Without the capital gains, therefore, saving
may have needed to be higher to maintain households’
financial wealth.  Rapid increases in house prices may also
have facilitated lower saving by providing more collateral
against which to borrow.
Survey data from the British Household Panel Survey on the
balance sheets of individual households suggest that it was
older households that gained the most from asset price rises.
But it appears to be younger households that reduced their
saving the most.  That might suggest that asset prices played
less of a role in reducing saving, unless those gains were
eventually expected to be passed down from the older
generation.
Factors pushing up on household saving
There are some other factors that might have worked in the
opposite direction over the 1995 to 2007 period.
Demographics may have been pushing up on the saving ratio.
The proportion of middle-aged households has been rising
over the past decade, and they are typically expected to save
more than younger or older households.  In addition,
employers boosted their pension contributions substantially in
the earlier part of this decade.  Excluding such contributions,
the saving ratio would have fallen even more sharply over that
period (Chart 5).  Theory suggests households would have
factored these additional payments into their own saving
decisions — so if companies had not boosted their
contributions, households may have boosted theirs, leaving
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Chart 3 Sectoral breakdown of national saving
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.196 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
factor them in, the company contributions will have raised the
saving ratio.
The decline in household saving in an international
context
Many of the factors that are likely to have pulled down on
household saving in the United Kingdom are likely to be
related to some extent.  For example, lower long-term real
interest rates could be associated with rising asset prices and
looser credit constraints.  Many of the factors are also global in
nature.  Falling real interest rates, rising asset prices and
greater macroeconomic stability were present in many
countries.  The loosening in credit conditions also appears to
have been an international phenomenon.  As the IMF (2009)
indicated:  ‘While the credit boom in the 1920s was largely
specific to the US, the boom during 2004–07 was global, with
increased leverage and risk-taking in advanced economies and
many emerging economies’.(1)
This is consistent with a fall in saving ratios across many
countries, although there is a large dispersion in the size of the
falls (Chart 6).  This dispersion suggests the influence of these
factors may have varied across countries and that there may
also be a role for country-specific influences driving the
behaviour of saving.  
In summary, there are a range of factors that are likely to 
have pushed down the household saving ratio in the 
United Kingdom between the mid-1990s and 2007.  The
decline over that period may not, therefore, be surprising.  But
that is not to say that such a low level of saving by historical
standards will persist.  Many of the factors that have acted to
push down saving can unwind, as is shown in the next section.
The potential impact of the financial
turbulence since 2007
The abrupt change in financial conditions and the economic
outlook over the past two years is likely to have led to a
marked change in households’ perceptions of their own
financial position.(2) That could have important consequences
for their spending and saving decisions.  By the end of 2008
and early 2009, the saving ratio had picked up a little relative
to 2007 and early 2008.  This section looks at some of the key
factors that may lead to a change in saving behaviour, most of
which represent a reversal of the factors outlined above that
are likely to have pushed down on saving in the past.
Tighter credit conditions
As the financial crisis has unfolded, banks have become much
less willing to extend credit to households (Chart 7).  This
tightening in credit conditions has taken the form of a rising
cost of borrowing relative to risk-free interest rates and greater
quantity constraints (for example larger deposits being
required on mortgage loans).  This may make some households
less willing or able to spend as much as they might otherwise
have done, thereby increasing saving.(3)
Furthermore, households may be more concerned that credit
will be expensive or difficult to obtain should they need it in
the future.  The spread over risk-free rates charged on new
mortgages has risen by around 21/@ percentage points over the
past two years.  If at least part of that is expected to persist
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Chart 6 Changes in saving ratios across countries
Source:  OECD.
(a) The UK data do not incorporate revisions arising from the June 2009 Blue Book. 
(b) Data for the United Kingdom and Spain are on a gross basis, including consumption of fixed
capital (for example housing depreciation).  Data for all other countries are net of fixed
capital consumption.  Data include saving by non-profit institutions serving households
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Chart 7 Bank of England Credit Conditions Survey:
availability of credit to households
(a) Net percentage balances are calculated by weighting together the responses of those lenders
that answered the question.  A negative balance indicates that less credit has become
available over the past three months.
(1) For a discussion of some of these factors see Astley, Giese, Hume and Kubelec(2009)
in this edition of the Quarterly Bulletin.
(2) As noted earlier, an international perspective on the credit crisis is provided in Astley,
Giese, Hume and Kubelec(2009) in this edition of the Quarterly Bulletin.
(3) Higher spreads have been more than offset by the decline in Bank Rate, so the
effective rates paid on new borrowing have fallen.  But quantity restrictions mean that
less credit is available at these prices. Research and analysis Household saving 197
Increased job uncertainty
As noted earlier, the level of precautionary saving undertaken
by households also depends on the risk of a significant fall in
income.  As the recession has deepened, job losses have
become more widespread.  The unemployment rate has risen
by around 21/@ percentage points over the past two years.
Households’ expectations of how unemployment will change
in the future have also risen (Chart 8).  A rise in saving may be
even more likely given that the current recession followed a
prolonged period of economic stability and low
unemployment, when households may have kept
precautionary saving at a low level.
On the face of it, an increase in precautionary saving while the
economy is in recession may seem counterintuitive.  Instead,
households might be expected to run down their saving to
smooth their consumption.  But during the recession in the
1990s, saving increased sharply.  The saving ratio rose from a
trough of just over 3% in 1988 Q3 to a peak of just over 12%
in 1992 Q1.  Concerns about households’ future financial
position may at times outweigh the desire to maintain earlier
consumption levels.
Falling asset prices
The financial turbulence over the past two years has been
accompanied by sharp falls in asset prices.  That has reduced
the value of assets held by households and hence reduced their
wealth (Chart 9).  Net financial wealth fell by around a quarter
in the two years to 2009 Q1, although the subsequent rebound
in financial asset prices is likely to have recovered part of those
losses.  The decline in wealth may lead households to look to
increase their saving for a period to rebuild their balance sheet.
It is difficult to assess how much, if at all, households might
seek to rebuild their wealth.  This will depend on a variety of
factors, including expectations of key drivers such as future
incomes.  Nevertheless, net financial wealth relative to 
post-tax income is currently low compared with its average
over the past 20 years.
The stock of wealth held by households is large relative to their
income, and so saving flows are only likely to have a gradual
impact.  For example, even if households saved as much as
10% of their income, it would take them nine years to bring
wealth back up from its 2009 Q1 level to the average over the
past 20 years (assuming no further changes in asset prices and
households continued to invest around 4 percentage points of
their saving in new housing).  This might suggest, therefore,
that a sharp adjustment in saving is required in response to
movements in asset prices.  But in practice, sharp changes in
saving are not always seen.  For instance, although the saving
ratio fell in the late 1990s as asset prices rose, it remained
little changed as asset price falls reduced net financial wealth
again in the early part of this decade (Chart 10).
The value of housing assets has also declined sharply over the
past two years.  Although, as noted earlier, this is less likely to
have an impact through an ordinary wealth effect, lower house
values mean that households have less collateral against
which to borrow.  Hellebrandt et al (2009) estimated that
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Chart 8 Households’ expectations of unemployment
Source:  Research carried out by GfK NOP on behalf of the European Commission.
(a) Net balance of households expecting unemployment in the United Kingdom to rise over the
following twelve months.198 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
mortgages were in negative equity in Spring 2009, meaning
the value of their mortgage exceeded the value of their house,
and hence had no collateral against which to borrow more.
The proportion of households with high loan to value ratios 
(in excess of 75%) is also estimated to have increased sharply
over the past two years.  This is likely to interact with
tightening credit conditions to make it harder or more
expensive to obtain credit, leading to lower consumption and
higher saving.
Reassessment of debt levels
Households may also seek to increase saving to repay debt,
although as this section highlights, aggregate debt levels can
also adjust in other ways over time.  In principle, it should be
households’ net financial wealth that matters for consumption
and saving.  But gross balance sheet positions may also matter
(see Benito et al (2007)).  Even if high debt levels are backed by
assets, they make households more vulnerable to changes in
asset prices or financing costs.  Debt levels have risen
substantially over the past decade, to around 1.7 times
annualised post-tax income, compared with one times income
for most of the 1990s.  Given the sharp increase in asset price
volatility during the recent financial turbulence, households
may seek to reduce their debt levels.
Households may be less likely to try to reduce their debt levels
rapidly provided they can continue to service those debts.  A
standard measure of affordability — income gearing — has
improved since early 2008.  That is, the proportion of
household income devoted to paying debt interest has fallen
back recently and is now close to the average of the past
fifteen years (Chart 11).  This reflects falls in Bank Rate, which
have brought down interest costs in spite of increasing spreads
of lending rates over Bank Rate.  Of course, debt may become
less affordable if Bank Rate were to rise.  
The distribution of debt across households can also be
important.  Even if average debt levels appear manageable, a
significant minority of mortgagors for example have relatively
high debt to income ratios (Chart 12).  But any adjustment
depends on how far such households might seek to reduce
their ratios.  For example, if all those with ratios above five
sought to reduce them to five that would require a reduction in
aggregate debt of around 6% (around 10% of annualised 
post-tax income).  That could imply a significant increase in
saving, even if the adjustment took place over a few years.
Furthermore, unsecured bank credit levels, although much
smaller, have also risen, by around 6% of annualised post-tax
income since the start of the decade.  An adjustment in those
debt levels could also imply a significant increase in saving. 
Household saving does not necessarily need to rise for debt
levels to be reduced.  Some households may be able to sell
financial assets and use the proceeds to repay debt, although
the scope for this may be limited because many debtors are
unlikely to have substantial asset holdings.  Aggregate debt
levels could also fall as declines in house prices feed through.
Households entering the housing market now have to take out
lower mortgages than those who bought when prices were
high.  It can take some time for this to feed through to the
entire stock of mortgages given that turnover in the housing
market is relatively low (a house might typically change hands
only once every ten years or so).  Furthermore, some existing
mortgages will have been taken out before the sharp increases
in house prices earlier this decade.  So when those houses are
sold, the new mortgages may still be higher than the previous
ones.  Aggregate debt levels may not fall that far, therefore, as
they are still responding to earlier house price increases as well
as the subsequent falls.(1) This link between the housing
market and debt levels also suggests that any desire by
households to reduce mortgage debt levels could feed through
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Chart 11 Household income gearing(a)
(a) Interest payments as a percentage of household post-tax income.  The interest payment
series excludes the adjustments made by the ONS to account for financial intermediation
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Chart 12 Distribution of mortgagors’ total debt to
income ratios
Sources:  NMG Research survey 2008 and Bank calculations.
(1) For a more detailed description of mortgage debt dynamics, see Hamilton (2003).Research and analysis Household saving 199
Higher government borrowing
As noted earlier, Ricardian equivalence can mean that
increases in public sector borrowing lead to greater saving by
the private sector.  Cyclical swings in public sector borrowing
can help households to smooth their consumption over the
cycle, for example as lower taxes and higher benefits cushion
the falls in incomes during a recession.  In that case, private
saving may not adjust.  But structural changes in public sector
borrowing are more likely to provoke a change in private
saving.  Over the past year, projections of cyclically adjusted
public sector net borrowing have been revised up sharply
(Chart 13).  In the August 2009 Inflation Report, the MPC
noted that households might feel that they need to save more
to meet a higher future tax burden, given the fiscal
consolidation that will be necessary in the years ahead.
As noted earlier, credit constraints may mean that households
are less likely to increase their saving in response to higher
government borrowing.  The number of credit-constrained
households is likely to be higher than usual in the current
environment.  In the 2008 NMG survey of households
conducted for the Bank, the number of households reporting
that they had been put off spending by concerns about credit
availability had risen to 16%, from 10% in 2006.  To the extent
that tax cuts allow households to spend more without
accessing credit, this could reduce the impact of higher
government borrowing on household saving somewhat.
Lower expected future income
The recession may also have influenced households’
expectations of their future income and hence permanent
income.  In the August 2009 Inflation Report, the MPC
expected growth in the productive supply capacity of the
economy to be eroded.  For example, capital spending is likely
to be weaker and some unemployed individuals may choose to
leave the labour market altogether.  If households have revised
down their expectations of future income relative to current
income, this would lead them to save more now to smooth
their consumption path.
It is difficult to measure households’ expectations of future
income.  But a number of indicators might be expected to
provide a guide to any changes in permanent income.  Survey
measures of consumer confidence should reflect changes in
households’ financial position.  And households might be
expected to rein in spending on durable goods particularly
sharply in response to a change in permanent income.  This is
because durable goods provide a flow of services that
households consume over a length of time — so any desired
change in the flow of services requires a larger swing in
expenditure to adjust households’ stock of durables.(1)
Persistent changes in actual income growth might also signal a
change in permanent income rather than temporary
fluctuations.  Chart 14 shows a measure constructed from
these indicators and scaled to match the mean and variance of
household consumption.  This proxy measure of permanent
income has fallen sharply since the start of the financial crisis,
which might suggest that households have revised down
estimates of their permanent income. 
Monetary policy
Over the past year, monetary policy has been providing a
substantial stimulus to the economy that should act to
smooth any adjustment in household saving.  Bank Rate is
close to zero and the asset purchases being undertaken by the
Bank of England should act to push up asset prices.  Low
interest rates encourage households to spend rather than save,
and higher asset prices will increase households’ wealth.  As a
result, monetary policy will tend to cushion the extent to


































Chart 13 HM Treasury projections of cyclically adjusted
public sector net borrowing
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Chart 14 Household consumption and a proxy measure
of permanent income
Sources:  Research carried out by GfK NOP on behalf of the European Commission, ONS and
Bank calculations.
(a) Average of three measures:  a four-quarter moving average of post-tax labour income
growth, the share of durables in total household spending and consumer confidence.  Each
measure has been scaled to match the mean and variance of household consumption.
(1) Spending on durables could be thought of as an additional part of household saving,
in addition to accumulating financial assets and investing in housing.  Instead of
purchasing a durable good, households could choose to rent items for a period and
use the money not spent on the good to accumulate financial assets.200 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
Conclusion
Household decisions to spend or save reflect a wide range of
factors, and they will be affected both by current
developments and changes in households’ expectations for the
future.  The household saving ratio declined over the period
1995 to 2007, reaching historically low levels.  Much of that
may be explained by falling real interest rates, looser credit
conditions, rises in asset prices and greater macroeconomic
stability.  Lower household saving may also have been offset
to some extent by higher corporate saving. 
More recently, the financial crisis and the subsequent recession
have led to tightening credit conditions, falling asset prices and
greater job insecurity.  Households may respond by increasing
their precautionary saving.  They may also save more if they
are concerned about higher taxes in the future to reduce the
fiscal deficit.  Finally, households may seek to rebuild their
balance sheets.  All of these effects are, however, highly
uncertain.  History does not provide a clear guide.  Saving
increased sharply in the early 1990s recession and remained
high for some time.  But in the 1970s, the response of saving
was muted and when adjusted for inflation, the saving ratio
fell and was actually negative at times.
The persistence of the different influences on saving will vary:
some factors currently pushing up on saving may be
temporary, whereas others are more likely to persist.  For
example, increased job uncertainty might be expected to be a
temporary feature of the recession.  But job uncertainty could
be persistently higher if households now believed that the
economic stability from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s was
unusual.(1) One influence that is likely to persist is that credit
conditions are likely to remain tighter than in the period
leading up to the financial crisis, although not as tight as at
present.  
Any adjustment in saving is likely to have important
consequences for the economic outlook, given the importance
of household spending within aggregate demand.  Indeed, any
attempt to reduce consumption is likely to push down on
output and hence household incomes.  That could actually
make it harder for households to increase their saving — an
effect known as the paradox of thrift.  The substantial stimulus
provided by monetary policy is not designed to prevent an
adjustment in saving from taking place, but it should smooth
the path of spending, and reduce the disruption to output and
therefore inflation.
(1) Back in 2004, it had already been suggested that this ‘nice’ (non-inflationary
consistently expansionary) decade would come to an end.  See King (2004).Research and analysis Household saving 201
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